Management of pension funds : the case of Portugal by Medeiros Garcia, Maria Teresa




Management of Pension Funds: the Case of 
Portugal 
Maria Teresa Medeiros Garcia 
ISEG (School of Economics and Management), University of Lisbon, and UECE (Research Unit on Complexity and 
Economics), Rua Miguel Lupi, 20, 1249-078 Lisbon, Portugal. 
UECE (Research Unit on Complexity and Economics) is financially supported by FCT (Fundação para a Ciência e a 
Tecnologia), Portugal. This article is part of the Strategic Project (Pest-OE/EGE/UI0436/2014). 
mtgarcia@iseg.utl.pt 
 
Abstract – The concern with the long term viability of 
most of existing government-operated pension systems, 
due to demographic changes, have led to various 
proposals for pensions reform, many of which have 
already been put into action. However, pension reform 
remains a highly controversial issue due to its 
complexity. This article brings attention to the 
management performance issue concerning funded 
systems. Detailed evidence and discussion is given to 
both investment performance results of public pension 
reserve funds, within the Social Security system, and to 
private pension funds in Portugal. Policy implications 
are also analysed and discussed.  
Keywords ‐ Social security system, partially funded system, 
private pensions, investment performance, Portugal. 
 
1. Introduction 
One of the central questions regarding the financing 
of pensions concerns the existence, or non-existence, 
of prior accumulation. This may take the form of 
obligatory State social insurance or, alternatively, of 
a private insurance scheme, which is either obligatory 
or optional. Either form must guarantee the payment 
of the pensions required.  
Two methods for the financing of benefits are 
available: the pure distribution system1, where 
current contributions cover the payments of current 
pension obligations, and the pure capitalization 
system2, where a reserve is created previously for the 
purpose of attaining the defined benefit which it is 
intended to guarantee, contributions being calculated 
actuarially. Capitalization comprises the investment, 
at compound interest rates, of the total of premiums 
or contributions received, net of management and 
acquisition charges, in order to obtain, by a given 
date, the capital necessary to distribute as life 
pensions. These mechanisms or technical instruments 
cannot be defined as being uniquely public or private. 
State capitalization can exist alongside private 
pension distribution and, conversely, private 
capitalization alongside State distribution.  
                                                            
1 Or pay-as-you-go system. 
2 Or fully funded system. 
The debate about the need, if any, for pension reform, 
initiated by the concern for long term financial 
viability of existing government-operated pension 
systems (Bongaarts, 2004), must highlight their basic 
principles and the various aspects related to 
efficiency, distribution, and stability (Lindbeck and 
Persson, 2003; Bonoli and Palier, 2007; Börsch-
Supan, 2007; Lewis and Lloyd-Sherlock, 2009; 
Cutler. and Waine, 2013). Hence, the move from an 
unfunded (pay-as-you-go) and non-actuarial system, 
to a more actuarial system, or even to a fully funded 
system, requires considerable discussion about these 
aspects, as well as risk and risk sharing issues, 
administrative costs (CBO, 2004), and investment 
performance (Logue and Rader, 1998; Thomas and 
Tonks, 2001; Coggburn and Reddick, 2007). In 
addition, the choice between public and private 
management of pension funds is crucial (World 
Bank, 1994, 2001). Eventually, the design of a 
balanced pension system is desirable (Ostaszewski, 
2012b). Recently, an agenda for making pensions 
adequate and sustainable in the long term was 
proposed (by the European Commission, in 2012). 
Many OECD countries, including Portugal, have built 
up public pension reserves to help pay for State 
pensions. In these countries, in 2009, public pension 
reserves were worth nearly 20% of GDP (OCDE 
2011). On the other hand, private pension 
arrangements have been growing in importance in 
recent years, as pension reforms have reduced public 
pension entitlements. In 2009, OECD pension fund 
assets reached USD 16.8 trillion. This trend is aligned 
with the idea that the retirement systems should be 
supported by four pillars or tiers (Dixon, 2008; 
Ostaszewski, 2012a). 
This paper analyses the investment performance of 
public and privately managed pension funds in 
Portugal. Both are affected by the financial crisis, 
which has simultaneously led to decreasing levels of 
interest rates, real economic growth rates and rates of 
return, since the 1980s (Ostaszewski, 2012a).  The 
next section describes the issues concerning public 
pension reserve funds.  Following this, the private 
pension funds market is analysed, as well as the 
comparison of investment performance results. 










2. Public pension reserve funds 
Public pension reserve funds (PPRFs) are reserves 
established by governments to meet public pension 
expenditure3. Therefore, they are expected to play a 
major role in the future financing of public pension 
systems, alleviating the impact of population ageing 
(Coleman, 2006). However, due attention to PPRFs 
investments and impact on financial markets has not 
been given. Indeed, one might ask what information 
is available to assess the investing strategies of 
PPRFs in order to understand investments in 
Citigroup, Morgan Stanley, and Merrill Lynch, 
during the 2008 financial crisis, by several sovereign 
                                                            
3 Two sub-categories of pension reserve funds can be 
identified: Social Security Reserve Funds (SSRFs) and 
Sovereign Pension Reserve Funds (SPRFs) (Blundell-
Wignall, Hu, and Yermo, 2008). 
wealth funds where PPRFs are included (Gintschel 
and Scherer, 2008; Ainina and Mohan, 2010). In 
addition, good pension fund governance is needed to 
value creation (Clark and Urwin, 2008; Truman, 
2008). 
By the end of 2009, the total amounts of PPRFs 
assets were equivalent to USD 4.6 trillion for the 17 
OECD countries (OECD, 2011). The largest reserve 
was held by the US Social Security Trust Fund, at 
USD 2.5 trillion, accounting for 54.7% of total 
OECD assets, although these assets consist of non-
tradable special bonds issued by the US Treasury to 
the Social Security Trust4. Japan’s government 
pension investment fund was second, with USD 1.3 
trillion, representing 28.2% of the OECD total. 
                                                            
4 The 2009 and 2010 shortfalls of OASDI were covered 
with interest generated by trust fund assets. 
 
 
1. There are five Swedish National Pension Funds (AP1-AP4 and AP6). 
2. 2009 data refers to fiscal year 2010, ending March 31, 2010. 
3. AGIRC and ARRCO are unfunded mandatory supplementary plans for white-collar and blue-collar workers respectively, with reserves. More 
information on these plans can be found in the OECD Private Pensions Outlook 2008. 
4. Data refers to June of each year. 
5. 2009 data refers to the period January-March 2010. 
Source: Adapted from OECD Global Pension Statistics. 
Figure 1. PPRFs’ real net investment return in selected OECD countries, 2008-2009 (%) 
n.d.
n.d.




























Countries such as Korea, Sweden and Canada had 
also accumulated large reserves, respectively 
accounting for 4.7%, 2.3% and 2.3% of the total.  
On the other hand, in 2009, on average, PPRF assets 
accounted for 18.4% of GDP in the OECD area. The 
Swedish AP funds registered the highest ratio, with 
27.2% of GDP. Other countries with a significant 
ratio included Korea, with 26.1%, and Japan, with 
23.2%. 
Regarding asset allocation of public pension reserve 
funds, bonds and equities were the predominant asset 
classes within PPRF portfolios at the end of 2009. In 
some reserve funds, there was a strong equity bias, 
which reflects their long-term investment outlook and 
a generally greater investment autonomy. For 
example, in 2009, Ireland’s national pensions reserve 
fund invested 72.0% of its assets in equities and 5.5% 
in bonds, whilst the figures for Norway were 
respectively 61.4% and 33.9%, for Sweden (AP3 
fund) 50.2% and 35.6%, and 44.2% and 23.7% for 
Australia. On the other hand, reserve funds in Japan, 
Portugal, Poland and Mexico invested much more in 
bonds than equities in 2009. The Belgian, Spanish 
and US PPRFs, the extreme cases, are by law, fully 
invested in government bonds (except for the case of 
the Spanish fund, where 3.3% of total assets are 
invested in cash and deposits).  
Furthermore, some PPRFs also started to invest in 
real estate and non-traditional asset classes, such as 
private equity and hedge funds. The funds with the 
highest allocation of private equity and hedge funds 
were New Zealand (26.7% of total in 2009), Canada 
(17.1%) and Australia (12.7%). 
Investment performance is a most important issue in 
relation to public pension reserve funds.  Generally, 
in 2009, public pension reserve funds regained 
ground lost during the 2008 crisis. However, the 
impact of the crisis on PPRFs’ investment returns 
varies greatly across countries, as some funds 
experienced strong negative returns in 2008 of more 
than –20% (Ireland, Norway, the French pension 
reserve fund and Sweden), while others had positive 
returns (Belgium, Spain, the United States and 
Mexico) 5 . At the end of 2009, all funds for which 
data is available, experienced positive, real net 
investment returns, ranging from 1.3% in Mexico, to 
30.7% in Norway. On average, investment returns 
were slightly negative in 2008, and positive in 2009 
(when weighted by total assets), increasing from –
2.0% in 2008, to 6.2% in 2009. By the end of 2009, 
the total amount of PPRF assets was on average 7.3% 
higher than at the end of 2008, and 13.9% higher than 
in December 2007. 
Taking into account the burden of future generations, 
the Portuguese government introduced partial public 
capitalisation in 1989, with the creation of a public 
                                                            
5 Real (after inflation) returns are calculated using national 
valuation methodologies. 
pension reserve fund6. Since then, the surplus of the 
providential system is transferred to this fund, 
although not on a regular basis, for investment in 
financial markets, which are managed under the 
principles of capitalization7. Thus, the public Social 
Security system is financed by the pay-as-you-go 
system, as well as the reserve fund. The idea is that 
return on investments will be sufficient to reinforce 
the financial reserves and help absorb the expected 
rising costs created by the fact that more and more 
members of the active population are entering 
retirement, plus the phenomenon of high long term 
unemployment.  
The Social Security Law of 2000 explicitly takes into 
account and reinforces partial capitalisation, 
stipulating that between two and four percent of 
employees’ contributions must be transferred into the 
reserve fund (employee contribution rate is 11% of 
gross remuneration), up to the point where 
expenditure on pensions is guaranteed for a minimum 
period of two years. This measure is in addition to the 
annual surplus in the providential system, and was 
designed to ensure the financial viability 
(sustainability) of the Social Security system. Silva et 
al. (2004) analyse the accounts of the providential 
system, as well as its impact on the portfolio of the 
public pension reserve fund. They conducted a 
simulation of the fund’s assets which allowed them to 
conclude that the fund’s assets reach their peak of 
12,032.502 million euros in 2012 and that the fund 
will have to be mobilized for the first time in 2011, 
and will run out in 2026. More recently, the new 
Social Security Law of 2007 establishes that the 
complementary system includes a public regime of 
capitalization8 , in addition to the existent 
complementary regimes of an individual and 
collective nature9.  
The partial pre-funding of the otherwise pay-as-you-
go system by the establishment and development of a 
public pension reserve fund was subject to an 
analysis of investment controls, in order to evaluate 
the sound management of this type of fund (Yermo, 
2007, 2008). Comparison with private pension plans 
                                                            
6 Or Social Security Trust Fund (Fundo de Estabilização 
Financeira da Segurança Social - FEFSS). 
7 This pension fund mainly invests the surpluses of 
employee and employer contributions over current payouts. 
Hence, this is a Social Security reserve funds or SSRFs 
(Truman, 2008).  
8 In February 2008 retirement certificates (Certificados de 
Reforma) were established. They are for voluntary, 
individual contributions. In December 2011 their reference 
value was 1.08710 € and the fund value was 19,990,439.64 
€. The contribution rate is between 2% and 4% of 
employees’ salary. At the end of 2009, there were 7425 
contributors. 
9 These include professional and individual private pension 
plans. 




is unavoidable. The following section describes the 
Portuguese public pension reserve fund. 
 
1.1 The Portuguese public pension 
reserve fund 
The public pension reserve fund is managed by a 
State institution, the IGFCSS10. The investment 
policy followed by the management board of 
IGFCSS must guarantee preservation of capital, 
which necessitates a rate of growth at least equal to 
the expected inflation rate for the Euro Zone. The 
public pension reserve fund is considered an 
instrument of public capitalisation.  
At the end of the financial year of 2009, the FEFSS’ 
assets stood at 9,407.66 million euros, corresponding 
to 97.8% of annual pension benefits expenditure (or 
11.74 months, which is still inferior to the objective 
of two years), representing 5.7% of GDP. Portuguese 
State bonds constitute the greatest proportion of 
investments, reflecting the legal obligation that not 
less than 50% of assets must be invested in 
government bonds. Equities accounted for 17.13% of 
the portfolio, although the legal maximum is set at 
25%. 
As from 2002, a new eligible asset class was 
approved - the strategic reserve, with a cap of 5% of 
total assets. By 2009 it represented 2.27% of the 
portfolio. 
 
2.1 The profitability of the Portuguese 
public pension reserve fund portfolio 
Investments results for the period 2000-2009 are 
generally positive (Table 1). 
Over this ten year period, assets under management 
have significantly grown, displaying an average 
nominal rate of return of 4.07%, and an average real 
rate of return of 1.96%. The growing weight of 
                                                            
10 IGFCSS – Instituto de Gestão de Fundos de 
Capitalização da Segurança Social, approved in 1999. 
equities in portfolio composition has meant that 
performance has been adversely affected by the 
financial crises of 2000-2002 and 2008 onwards 
(Franzen, 2010). 
All the same, the management model of FEFSS won 
the Investments & Pension Europe Award for the best 
pension fund in Portugal in 2006 and in 2009. 
In 2009 a new strategic management policy was 
established, which includes risk management 
indexation to EFFAS Portugal and transition to a 
dynamical benchmark. 
 
3. Private pensions funds 
 
Private pension arrangements are increasingly 
important for the provision of retirement income, as 
pension reforms have reduced public pension 
entitlements. Private pensions are mandatory and 
voluntary private pensions as well as occupational 
and personal private pensions (OECD, 2011). In 2009 
the United States had the largest pension fund market 
within OECD member countries, with assets worth 
USD 9.6 trillion, representing 57.1% of the total.  
 
Table 1. Investments returns on PPRF in Portugal, 2000-2009, % 
	
 



















































Source: IGFCSS Annual Reports 




Several other OECD countries have large pension 
fund systems. In 2009, the United Kingdom had 
assets worth USD 1.6 trillion, accounting for a 9.5% 
share of the OECD pension fund market. Japan had 
USD 1.0 trillion, representing 6.2% of the total. The 
Netherlands, USD 1.0 trillion (6.1%); Australia, USD 
0.8 trillion (4.8%); and Canada, USD 0.8 trillion 
(4.8%). 
In 2009, three countries registered asset-to-GDP 
ratios higher than 100%. The Netherlands (129.8%), 
Iceland (118.3%) and Switzerland (101.2%). In 
addition to these countries, Australia (82.3%), the 
United Kingdom (73.0%) and the United States 
(67.6%) exceeded the OECD weighted average asset-
to-GDP ratio of 67.6%. In such countries, funded 
pensions have been in place for a long time, and, with 
the exception of the United Kingdom and the United 
States, have mandatory or quasi-mandatory private 
pension systems. Pension fund assets were of varying 
importance relative to GDP in the other countries. 
Almost 40% of the countries (13 out of 34) had asset-
to-GDP ratios above 20%.  
Some countries have introduced mandatory funded 
pension systems in recent years. Chile has the longest 
 
 
1. 2009 data refers to the period January-June 2009. 








































Figure 2. Pension funds' real net investment return in selected OECD countries, 2008-2009 (%) 
 




history and has accumulated assets close to the 
OECD average (65.1%). Hungary, Mexico, Poland 
and the Slovak Republic also introduced mandatory 
private pensions in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
Assets have grown rapidly since that point, reaching 
around 13% of GDP in Hungary and Poland.  
At the end of 2009, bonds and equities were the most 
common kind of investment in pension fund 
portfolios. Proportions of equities and bonds vary 
considerably across countries but there is a greater 
preference for bonds in general. 
On average, pension funds experienced a positive 
investment rate of return of 6.5% in real terms up to 
the end of 2009, recovering from a negative average 
return of 22.5% in real terms in 2008 (Figure 2). The 
best performing pension funds amongst OECD 
countries in 2009 were Chile (23%), Hungary (17%), 
The Netherlands (16%) and Luxembourg (14%). In 
fact, during 2009, pension funds in the OECD 
recovered around USD 1.5 trillion of the USD 3.5 
trillion in market value that they had lost in 2008 
(from USD 18.7 trillion in December 2007 to USD 
15.3 trillion in December 2008). 
Pension funds efficiency, as measured by the total 
operating costs in relation to assets managed, ranges 
from 0.1% to 1.2% (Figure 3). 
In general, countries with defined-contribution 
systems and those with large numbers of small funds 
appear to have higher operating costs than countries 
that only have a few funds offering defined-benefit, 
hybrid, or collective defined-contribution pension 
arrangements. This is in contrast to the general trend 
of transition from defined benefit to defined 




1. Data refers to 2008. 
2. Data does not include investment management costs. 
3. Data does not include self-managed superannuation funds. 
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Figure 3. Pension funds’ operating expenses as a share of total investments in selected OECD countries, 2009 
(%) 
1.1 Private pension funds in Portugal 
In Portugal, a voluntary occupational private pension 
system has been in operation since 1985, with a 
specific fiscal status which, in certain sectors such as 
banking, serves as an alternative to the defined 
benefit plans provided by the public sector. Personal 
retirement saving plans (PRSP) were launched in 
1989.  
The importance of the private pension sector has been 
growing in recent years, as pension reforms have 
reduced public pension entitlements and facilitated a 
complementary system (Garcia, 2004, 2006). In 
addition to occupational pension plans, this sector 
includes voluntary personal pension plans, both of 
which constitute the second and third pillars of the 
retirement system (Ostaszewski, 2012b). 
Decree-Law Nr. 12/06 currently regulates their 
activity, following the 2003/41/CE Directive. The 




main purpose of these provisions is to achieve the 
consolidation of the funds’ role as the privileged 
vehicle for private, complementary financing of the 
costs of covering the social risks associated with 
retirement.  
Indeed, as far as complementary plans are concerned, 
this system can be considered to be a veritable put-
option, in favour of employees, as explained by 
Merton et al. (1987). 
A distinction must be made between those pension 
funds managed by dedicated pension fund 
management companies and those under the 
management of life insurance companies. In 2010, 
there were 25 pension funds management institutions 
and 237 pension funds with 19,725 million euro of 
assets under their management11.  
The majority of pension funds, about 80 per cent of 
them, are managed by pension fund managers 
representing 98 per cent of the value under 
management, enhancing the role of pension funds 
management companies. In 2009, the private pension 
funds industry represented 13.40% of GDP of 
Portugal, amounting to 21,917 million euros. Closed 
pension funds are prominent among the various types 
of pension funds, representing more than 80 per cent 
of the amount under management. A closed fund is 
generally one in which there is only one 
member/sponsor. Should there be more than one 
member, this is subject to the condition that a 
connection of a corporate, associative, professional or 
social nature exists among the members, and that the 
consent of all of the existing members must be given 
before new members can be included. Closed funds, 
as well as open funds, are occupational. In an open 
fund there is no requirement for any connection 
whatsoever among the different parties constituting 
the fund and adhesion to the latter depends solely on 
acceptance being granted by the fund’s managing 
institution12. PRSP type is for personal funds.  
With regard to employment sectors, the banking and 
telecoms group pension schemes together account for 
the largest segment of the occupation pension fund 
market in Portugal. 
The majority of pension plans are of the defined 
benefit type. In defined contribution plans, 
contributions are customarily calculated as a pre-
determined fraction of salary, although this fraction 
does not necessarily remain constant throughout the 
employee’s working life. Many defined benefit plan 
                                                            
11 Since 2010 the government of Portugal transferred some 
funds of the telecom and banking sectors to the social 
security system.  The money was used to reduce the fiscal 
deficit and help meet Maastricht targets. 
12 Open funds can be constituted on the initiative of any 
institution authorized to manage pension funds. The global 
net value of the fund is divided into whole or partial 
participation units, which can be represented by certificates. 
formulae take into account the Social Security 
benefits to which employees are entitled. In such 
cases, the plans are said to be integrated and the value 
of the complementary pension will depend on the 
final value of the State pension. Contributions to 
these plans are generally based on a targeted benefit 
and can be shared between the employer and the 
employee. 
As far as participation in their financing is concerned, 
the pension plan can further be classified as 
contributive or non-contributive. In the case of the 
former, the employee finances the plan together with 
the employer, which leads to the existence of vested 
rights; in the latter case, the employer has sole 
responsibility for the financing, and such rights 
usually cease to exist in the event of an employee’s 
early departure. 
On the other hand, there is a decreasing trend of the 
defined benefit plans type of pension, and an 
increasing trend of the defined contribution plans 
type, probably as a result of accounting rules and 
regulatory changes (Yermo, 2007). 
2.1 The composition of the portfolio and 
profitability 
Investments portfolio composition registers a 
declining trend of the public debt component. By 
2009, private pension funds invested 21.30% in 
government bonds. On the other hand, the proportion 
accounted for by equities and trust units rose 
substantially, representing 37.50% in 2009.  
With regard to profitability, only aggregate 
information is available (Table 2).  




Table 2. Nominal returns on pension funds in Portugal, 2000-2009, % 
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The average rate of return for all types of pension 
funds decreased over the period 2000-2002. A 
positive trend is noticeable since 2003. However, 
the 2008 crisis had a very negative impact on 
profitability. In that year, pension funds registered 
the lowest rates of return in all the period, for all 
types of pension funds. 
This means that risks associated with pension funds 
should be taken into account especially that of 
market risk (Garcia, 2004; Bovenberg, 2007; 
Franzen, 2010).   
 
4. Results comparisons 
Comparing the investment performance results of 
State capitalisation by the analysis of public 
pension reserve funds, as opposed to those of 
private pension funds, enables one to conclude that 






Figure 4. Pension funds' nominal net investment return in private and public pension funds in Portugal, 2000-
2009 (%) 




In addition, the average rate of return over this ten 
years period is higher in the case of public pension 
reserve funds being 4.07% versus the average of 
3.29% in the case of private pension funds. 
Portfolio composition, as well as the performance of 
different types of assets might explain this 
conclusion. The weight of bonds is much bigger in 
the State portfolio, always being more than 70%, due 
to limitations by law, as opposed to the weight 
registered in private pension funds’ portfolios, which 
is less than 50% since 1999.  
Investment performance assessment in comparative 
terms should be considered by policy makers when 
the importance of complementary private retirement 
savings is increased. In fact, the 2008 crisis has 
highlighted the vulnerability of funded pension 
schemes to financial crises and economic downturns 
(Orenstein, 2013). Furthermore, it has emphasized 
the need to review the regulatory framework and 
scheme design to improve the safety of private 
pensions. Indeed, in the European Union, two 
instruments are already in place: the Directive on the 
protection of employees in the event of insolvency of 
their employer, and the Directive on the activities and 
supervision of Institutions for Occupational 
Retirement Provision. The pension market integration 





The aim of this work has been to analyse public 
pension reserve funds and private pension fund 
markets in Portugal. The focus of the analysis was on 
asset management results comparison and on the 
policy implications of the results.   
The basic pay-as-you-go government-oriented 
pension is complemented by a privately-funded 
pension which, when integrated with the Social 
Security scheme, constitutes a true financial option 
sold by the employer to the employee. For the 
employee, the most important factor is the guarantee 
of a secure income on retirement, regardless of the 
pension’s source. Therefore, an optimum portfolio of 
pension benefits is created, with the State component 
being the risk-free asset and a private component 
comprising the volatile asset, both occupational and 
personal. 
The introduction, in 1989, of partial public 
capitalisation, together with the establishment of a 
public pension reserve fund return, highlights the 
need for comparison with existing private 
capitalisation. The assessment of public, versus 
private, pension fund management, reinforces the 
idea that public management is not necessary bad and 
that private management is not necessarily good. 
Furthermore, investment performance analysis of 
pension funds in Portugal, either occupational or 
personal, justifies a detailed analysis of the problem 
of individuals’ capacity to protect themselves 
adequately in the absence of proper financial 
education and consumer regulation (Casey, 2004; 
Garcia, 2006; Waine, 2009). Frequently, the global 
movement of Social Security reforms has an implicit 
assumption about behavior, namely that the 
individual citizen to whom the responsibility of 
choice has been handed to, is a well-informed 
economic agent, who acts rationally to maximize 
their self-interest (Ring, 2010).  However, in the real 
world, peoples’ decisions are subject to several 
restrictions such as bounded rationality, bounded 
self-control, bounded self-interest or bounded 
selfishness (Burtless, 2004). In fact, individuals often 
base their retirement and saving choices on herd 
behavior, faulty logic, or defective information, 
showing astonishing ignorance of the most basic 
processes that determine future retirement incomes 
(Webb, 2009; Munnell et al. 2011; Casey and Dostal, 
2013). Social Security reforms might have created 
unintended consequences in the case of the risk posed 
by a retirement crisis (Lalani, 2012; Borowski, 2013). 
The recognition of these constraints is very important 
for the design, management and regulation of 
retirement systems. Retirement plan sponsors and 
policymakers are (and should be) becoming more 
aware of these issues, and are taking actions to 
promote consumer education and regulation 
(European Commission, 2012).  
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